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Abstract: West Africa was colonized by Britain, France and Portugal. It resulted 
in the creation of the Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone zones in the sub-
region. The Anglophone and Francophone have engaged themselves in rivalry 
exemplified by Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire who command high level of respect in 
their respective camps and this often created tension between the two countries 
before the outbreak of the horrific socio-political debacle that permeated the 
Liberian landscape. However, in spite of their differences, Nigeria and Cote 
d’Ivoire initiated, coordinated and handled peace talks by leading other member-
states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in their 
desire to put a halt to the genocide taking place in Liberia. This article, therefore, 
explores the diplomatic efforts of the ECOWAS’ member-nations to restore peace 
in the war-torn country. These pacific settlement initiatives were in two phases: the 
pre-ECOMOG formation and the post-ECOMOG creation diplomacy. The paper 
underscores the belief of the West African leaders in restoring and sustaining 
peace and security in the sub-region thereby revealing their sense of brotherhood 
and unity. 
 
Keywords: ECOWAS, Anglophone, Francophone, Liberian Civil War, Pacific 
Settlement. 
 
Introduction 
The New Imperialism which found expression in the imposition of colonial 
rule undoubtedly created socio-economic and politico-diplomatic cleavages 
between the Anglophone and Francophone zones in West Africa. The former’s 
arrowhead, Nigeria, was often regarded as a political cum imperial monster by the 
Francophone nations led by Cote d’Ivoire. This fact was borne out by Nigeria’s 
location astride the long Atlantic seaboard, endowment of mineral resources, vast 
fertile land suitable for agriculture and manpower resources as well as its 
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intimidating demographic paramountcy unrivalled by the population of any other 
country in Africa. 
 Indeed, the deep-seated animosity and suspicion between Nigeria and Cote 
d’Ivoire  were outcome of the French attitude who feared Nigeria during the pre-
independence period. Consequently, after political independence, France still 
Nigeria regarded as an economic rival competing with her (France) for the market 
opportunities in West Africa. It tried to maintain its influence on her former West 
African colonies and vigorously pursued disunity between  the Francophone and 
Anglophone blocs that Communate Economique d’Afrique Occidentale (CEAO) 
was established in 1972 to pursue1. By then, the Federal Military Government of 
Nigeria under the retired General Yakubu Gowon had been making efforts to 
establish ECOWAS which eventually became a reality in 1975. 
 The political and diplomatic confrontation between the Francophone bloc 
and Nigeria became more noticeable after the outbreak of the Liberian civil wars 
which started in 1989. The war was caused by socio-cultural, economic, military 
and political policies which found roots in the marginalization of the indigenous 
population by the Americo-Liberians who wielded power and influence. The 
leaders of ECOWAS’ member-states waded into the crises by exploring diplomatic 
means towards settling the dispute between the warring factions. The 
internationalization of the war compelled Nigeria under General I.B. Babangida to 
suggest the floating of a sub-regional force to counter the violence perpetrated by 
the ex-warlords and their troops. This move was suggested since there was no 
response from the international community to put an end to the genocide and 
devastation of economic locations and infrastructural facilities. The Francophone 
countries distanced themselves from the creation of what was later to become 
known as the ECOWAS’ Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). However, 
after the successful take off of ECOMOG some Francophone countries reluctantly 
contributed contingents of troops to participate in the ECOMOG military 
operations in Liberia. But in spite of the apprehension of the former French 
territories towards Nigeria, they cooperated and worked assiduously by utilizing 
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diplomacy before and after the establishment of the ECOMOG Force in the 
attempt of the sub-regional body to broker peace in Liberia. 
 
ECOWAS’ Heads of States and Governments Pre-ECOMOG Diplomatic 
Moves 
 
The post-independence African states have been beset by the insurrections 
of the masses.  The bitter truth of this development is that ‘some of these groups 
are sufficiently independent that they have themselves contracted mercenaries.  
They are often able to finance their activities by exploiting natural resources such 
as diamonds and timber in areas under their control’2. Hence, the ruling class in 
most of the African states have found it extremely difficult, if not completely 
impossible, to suppress rebels. 
 The case of Liberia was not an exception.  The political misadventure of 
the late Samuel Doe was stoutly countered by Charles Taylor who got foreign 
backing and exchanged diamonds for his military hardware.  Hence, Samuel Doe 
was unable to crush him and other political agitators’ reactionary forces that were 
opposed to his misrule. 
 It is noteworthy that prior to the diplomatic maneuvres of ECOWAS’ 
Heads of States and Governments before the situation degenerated into a full-
blown war, the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) had tried to intervene in the 
political crisis.  In 1986 the LCC attempted to mediate in the political conflicts 
after Doe’s inauguration.  However, their efforts were frustrated by Doe himself as 
he persecuted members of the LCC, forcing it to discontinue its mediation efforts.  
The massacre of people whose headless bodies were found around Monrovia 
following the Christmas eve in 1989 led to the invasion of Liberia by about 120 
men trained in Libya between 1987 and 1989.  In spite of the harsh treatment 
meted to the LCC, the body in 1989, worked with the National Muslim Council 
(NMC).  The two religious bodies organized the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee 
(IFMC) to negotiate an end to the hostilities3. The proposal of the IFMC was “a 
cease fire to be followed by the setting up of a transitional government; comprising 
recognized, existing political parties and representative ‘pressure groups’.  The 
                                                 
2
 S. Bryon Tarr, ‘ECOWAS’ ECOMOG initiative in Liberia: a Liberian perspective’,  Nigerian 
Forum, Lagos: NIIA March-April, 1993, p. 74. 
3
  Ibidem, p. 75. 
Timothy O. Erinosho                                                                       RJHIS 2 (2) 2015 
 
 
204 
 
head of the transitional government would not be eligible to contest for the 
‘presidency in democraticelections to be held within six months of the 
establishment of interim governance4.’ But the IFMC efforts failed because Taylor 
rejected its proposal and withdrew from the Freetown negotiations. 
 The political debacle posed serious security problem to the West African 
sub-region.  The peace and security of the zone was threatened.  This situation 
prompted the Heads of States and Governments of the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS), established in 1975, to strategize means to 
finding lasting solution to the conflicts.  We should remember that the original 
objectives of the organization, as contained in the ECOWAS Treaty are, among 
others‘ to promote co-operation and integration in order to create an economic 
union in West Africa’5.  However, Article 58 of the revised Treaty, which provides 
for regional security, contains the undertaking of member states ‘to work to 
safeguard and consolidate relations conducive to the maintenance of peace, 
stability and security within the region’6. 
 To this end, and in pursuit of these objectives, member states undertake to 
co-operate with the community in establishing and strengthening appropriate 
mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of intra-state and inter-state 
conflicts, paying particular regards to the need to: 
1. Maintain periodic and regular consultations between national borders’ 
administrative authorities; 
2. Establish local or national joint commissions to examine any problems 
encountered in relations between neighbouring states; 
3. Encourage exchanges and co-operations between communities, 
townships and administrative regions; 
4. Employ where appropriate good offices, conciliation, mediation and 
other methods of peaceful settlement if disputes exist; 
5. Establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace 
keeping force where appropriate; and  
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6. Provide where necessary and at the request of member states, assistance 
to member states for the observation of democratic election7. 
Thus Article 58 provides ECOWAS’ legal foundation or basis for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution in the sub-region.  It also provides for 
various aspects of conflict prevention, management, peace keeping and peace-
building.  Looking at the contents of this legal provision by ECOWAS one would 
agree that they are in conformity with those in the Charters of the United Nations 
and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) now African Union (AU).  
However, the ECOWAS Article 58 made no provisions for peace enforcement 
which could only be authorized by the Security Council. As David Wippman has 
remarked: 
When disputes can be dealt with through diplomacy, 
economic sanctions or consensual peace-keeping, 
regional organizations have a claim to primacy.  If 
coercive measures are required, however, then 
regional organizations are in a position that is only 
marginally better than that of individual states.  
Under Chapter VIII of the (UN) Charter, regional 
organizations must get the authorization of the 
Security Council before engaging in coercive 
measures amounting to enforcement action8. 
 
In conflict resolution, pacific settlement has primacy over the use of force.  
It was in this light that at the Thirteenth Summit of the OAU, held in Banju, 
Gambia, between May 28-30, 1990, the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee was established.  The Committee was made up of The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria.  Its communiqué called for an immediate cease-
fire in Liberia9. At the Summit of the Authority of Heads of State and Government 
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on Liberia re-emphasized the ECOWAS Protocol of Non-Aggression adopted in 
Dakar on 22 April, 197810. 
As the war progressed with Charles Taylor recording resounding military 
success to the detriment of Samuel Doe whose AFL was losing ground to the 
rebels, ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee intensified efforts so as to 
broker peace between the duo.  Between July 5-20, 1990, it initiated peace 
negotiations between them in Freetown.  But it was a failure as Taylor remained 
adamant, insisting that Doe must first step down.  By then, a factional group led by 
Yormie Johnson had broken away from the NPFL, forming the INPFL because of 
the political savagery being displayed by Charles Taylor.  Taylor’s refusal to back 
down was informed by the great success he was having. 
As the belligerents stuck to their guns, not willing to agree to a cease fire 
agreement, the Mediation Committee proposed to set up an Interim Government of 
National Unity (IGNU) which would include the representatives of all the political 
parties and the rebels, but certainly not headed by Samuel Doe or Charles Taylor11. 
The ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) was not weary of 
the assignment ahead of it.  Consequently, on 6 August 1990, the first session of 
the ECOWAS SMC was held at the Kariaba (or Kariba) Conference Centre Banju 
(Gambia).  It was chaired by Sir DaudaJawara, The Gambian President.  
Participants included the heads of state of Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, 
Mali and Togo.  Also present were the OAU Secretary General and members of 
the Inter-Faith Mediation Committee in attendance as observers.  The Committee 
began by noting ‘the wanton destruction of human life and property and the 
displacement of persons caused by the armed conflict’12.  At the end of the 
meeting, a communiqué was issued, again calling for an immediate ceasefire and 
established an ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ‘for the 
purposes of keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease-
fire is respected’13.  In addition, all the parties were to surrender all arms and 
ammunition to the custody of ECOMOG.  Furthermore, the Communiqué called 
for the establishment of an interim government.  It stated further: 
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It is also agreed that none of the leaders of the warring 
parties be allowed to hold office as leaders or members of 
the interim government, and that the leader of the interim 
government shall be ineligible to stand in thepresidential 
elections.  The interim government is to be charged with 
creating the necessary conditions for free and fair elections 
and to facilitate the return of refugees and political exiles.  
Finally, the Communiqué calls for a national conference of 
all political parties and interest groups, and establishes a 
Special Emergency Fund for ECOWAS and ECOMOG 
activities in Liberia.  Lt. General Arnold Quainoo of Ghana 
is named ECOMOG Commander14. 
 
A critical examination reveals that the peace talks were undertaken by the 
ECOWAS Anglophone countries – Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Gambia.  
Apart from Togo and Mali, Francophone countries appeared complacent since 
Liberia was not a French speaking country and there was a wedge being thrown 
between the Anglophone and Francophone blocs by France.  This will be dealt 
with later in this chapter. 
 The second reason for the French-speaking countries’ indifference was the 
bad leadership exhibited by C’oted’Ivorie, which is the richest and most influential 
among them. Burkina Faso also remained indifferent.  The acrimony that the two 
countries had against Samuel Doe and Nigeria discouraged them from participating 
in the peace moves.  As E.G. Berman and K.E. Sams have asserted: 
The leaders of these two countries supported Charles 
Taylor and the NPFL in their bid to oust President 
Doe.  When Doe had seized power in 1980, he killed 
then President William Tolbert and imprisoned 
Tolbert’s eldest son, Adolphus, who died in custody.  
This incensed Ivorian President Felix Houphouet-
Boigny who had been a close friend of President 
Tolbert and the father-in-law of Adolphus.  
Houphouet –Boigny’s same daughter subsequently 
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married Burkinabe President BlaiseCompaore.  
Beyond fulfilling personal vendettas, francophone 
states more generally viewed Taylor’s ascension to 
power a means of checking Nigeria’s hegemonic 
designs15. 
With the launching of ECOMOG notwithstanding, ECOWAS Heads of States and 
Governments did not relent in exploring diplomacy to resolve the crisis.  The 
ECOMOG peace-keeping and peace-enforcement went along with peace talks. 
 
Post-ECOMOG Formation Diplomatic Efforts and Settlement Between the 
Warring Factions 
 
 Naturally, it is a general belief that war only creates untold hardships, not 
only for the combatants on the theatre of operations, but also for diplomatic corps, 
humanitarian workers and the defenceless civilians who are caught up in the 
mayhem.  This fact influenced ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments to 
intensify action after forming ECOMOG.  Thus while the military were busy 
fighting the rebels the leaders mustered all their diplomatic acumen to ensure that 
the war prosecution was not prolonged more than necessary. 
 The armed offensive launched by ECOMOG which eventually helped to 
establish a neutral zone in Monrovia forced the NPFL to retreat to the eastern 
outskirts of the capital.  Thereafter, AFL and INPFL signed a cease-fire agreement 
in Banjul, agreeing to work with ECOMOG16.  The no-nonsense and 
uncompromising leadership of Major-General Dongoyaro (the FC) sought to create 
a defence perimeter resulting in ECOMOG engaging the NPFL.  Coupled with the 
ECOMOG military masterstroke was the diplomatic initiative to re-organize the 
government reached at Banjul I.  Between November 27-28, 1990, the 
reorganization of the Liberian government was reached at the First Extra-Ordinary 
Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government held in Bamako, Mali 
under the chairmanship of Sir DaudaJawara, then ECOWAS Chairman and 
President of The Gambia.  The session again called for a complete cease-fire in 
Liberia, ECOWAS monitoring the process, the holding of presidential and general 
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elections within12 months, and the observation of elections by ECOWAS and 
international bodies.  In effect, it reiterated and endorsed the ECOWAS Peace Plan 
(EPP)17.  The military and diplomatic moves compelled Charles Taylor to sue for 
peace so that he would not be schemed out of things.  He then signed the 
agreement which became effective a few days later and it was the only agreement 
he negotiated in good faith18.To integrate the warring factions, the NPFL, INPFL 
and AFL signed another agreement in Banjul, the Gambia, on December 21, 1990 
where it was proposed that a National Conference be convened within 60 days to 
discuss the establishment of a new interim administration.  In consonance with 
this, Professor Amos Sawyer who was installed on November 22, 1990, as interim 
President of Liberia by ECOWAS nominated 6 ministers in January 1991 and 
announced that general elections would be held within a year19. 
 It was rather sad to note that Charles Taylor was erratic and was not ready 
to abide by the terms of the agreement.  The formation of his own government 
named National Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly Government (NPRAG) of 
Greater Liberia with its headquarters in Gbarnga in late October 1990 partitioned 
Liberia between his government and Sawyer’s Monrovia based government.  
Besides, Taylor was spitting fire, vowing in his broadcast on the BBC African 
service to attack and destroy Freetown’s international airport (Sierra Leone).  This 
annoyed President Momoh who described Taylor as ‘ungrateful’20. 
 In March 1991, Charles Taylor made known his intention to contest for the 
presidential election contrary to the provision of the terms of the agreement 
prohibiting factional leaders from contesting the interim presidency.  Yet peace 
initiatives continued and there was the All-Liberia National Conference held at the 
Unity Conference centre in Virginia, Liberia.  It was attended by 151 delegates 
from major political parties, warring factions, interest groups and county 
representatives as well as the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC).  
The NPFL walked out when its call for a week break was not accepted.  The 
Assembly endorsed Amos Sawyer as president of the IGNU, established a 
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unicameral interim legislative assembly, composed of 51 members.  It also agreed 
on amnesty for all combatants21. However, the Interim Legislative Assembly 
lacked furniture items and stationeries and it could not finance the salaries of the 
lawmakers.  According to S.B. Tarr the IGNU functioned as if it were a 
government in a normal political environment; it was bowled by the weight of 
Liberian political culture’.  Though not limited by Banju II nor Monrovia, ‘it failed 
to evolve positions as to how it as the neutral body defined the contending claims, 
nor offer proposals for their fair resolution’22.  
 On July 29, 1991, the Committee of Five on Liberia held its first session in 
Yamoussoukro, Republic of Cote d’Ivoire under the chairmanship of President 
Felix Houphouet Boigny.  Other heads of state and government present as 
members of the committee were:  His Excellency Alhaji Sir Dauda Kairaba Jawara 
(The Gambia); His Excellency General Joao Bernado Vieira (Guinea Bissau); 
Abdou Diouf (Senegal) and Boutokotipo Yagninim, the Attorney-General and 
Minister of Justice, representing the Togolese President23. The president of the 
IGNU, Amos Sawyer was there while Taylor who turned down the invitation was 
represented by his foreign affairs advisers ‘who demanded full diplomatic 
recognition for their delegation including a flag-bearing vehicle and the reception 
ceremonies appropriate to a head of state’24. 
 The Ivorian President Boigny was forced to intervene in the dispute openly 
now because the spill over of residual arms from Taylor’s enclave on his borders 
was generating an increase in crime and instability in his own country.  The NPFL 
insisted that it could not disarm its troops in a situation where Nigeria held the 
upper hand in ECOMOG.  Charles Taylor indicated his willingness to encamp his 
soldiers and open the roads to the interior for free movement of civilians if the 
ECOMOG force could be modified to include troops from countries which he felt 
were likely to be more sympathetic to him than Nigeria.  He preferred receiving 
supervisory troops from the other countries attending the session than from 
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Nigeria25.The meeting was deadlocked.  The situation was worsened further by 
Yormie Johnson who pulled out of the Amos Sawyer-led IGNU.  He accused 
Sawyer of failing ‘to unify Liberia and create an atmosphere for free and fair 
elections’ and said further that the IGNU was characterized by economic 
mismanagement26.  Report had it that Amos Sawyer and the ECOMOG criticized 
the INPFL for executing members of his army including the Deputy Commander 
Colonel Moses Vanni.  This Johnson refuted by accusing Vanni of disarming 
INPFL fighters to hand over their weapons to ECOMOG27. 
 The ECOWAS leaders were not deterred by the events taking place in 
Liberia and the intensification of warfare.  Thus, between September 16-17, 1991, 
the Committee of Five in the Liberian crisis held its third meeting in 
Yamoussoukro, Cote D’Ivoire which was chaired by the host President.  Heads of 
State of Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal, Togo, Nigeria 
and Ghana also attended.  Charles Taylor, Amos Sawyer and a representative of 
the International Negotiation Network (INN) were also present.  The resolution 
was that encampment and disarmament processes were finalized.  It was agreed 
that for warring factions to encamp troops, disarm them and deposit their arms in 
armouries to be guarded by ECOMOG28. Taylor’s intransigency however stifled 
the implementation of this Peace Accord because his forces and the United 
Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO) continued fighting.  In 
October 1992, Taylor launched the highly destructive ‘Operation Octopus’ on 
Monrovia.  The heavy fighting led to destruction of lives and property, forcing the 
UN Security Council (SC) to impose an armed embargo on Taylor and the other 
factions.  Another fallout of the deadly operation was the SC’s appointment of 
Trevor Gordon-Somers, a Jamaican diplomat to wade into the crisis.  The UN-man 
relationship with ECOMOG and the IGNU was far from being cordial29. 
 The next diplomatic stage was set for the mediation efforts of the UN and 
ECOWAS.  Another accord was signed in Cotonou, Benin Republic, on 25 July, 
1993.  The Peace Accord called for the replacement of Sawyer’s interim 
government with a Liberian national transitional government (LNTG), which 
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would have three branches – legislative, executive and judiciary.  In addition a 
five-member council of state embracing all the factions in the conflict was to be set 
up.  Furthermore, it made proposal for the expansion of ECOMOG to include 
troops from other West African states – particularly ‘francophone countries, some 
of which were openly supportive of Taylor – as well as from states outside West 
Africa’30.The Accord also covered cease-fire, disarmament, demobilization, 
election modalities, repatriation of refugees, supervisory and monitoring authority, 
acts of violation, terms and conditions, encampment, peace enforcement powers, 
prisoners of war submission implementation, humanitarian assistance and General 
Amnesty31. The Accord was the most comprehensive of all the accords and 
agreements ever drafted and signed in the Liberian crisis.  IGNU and NPFL signed 
it while it received the blessing of ECOWAS, OAU and the UN.  Indeed, it was a 
major victory for ECOWAS and a major breakthrough in its diplomatic 
offensive32. 
 As good as the Cotonou Accord was, peace did not return to Liberia due to 
Charles Taylor’s hard-line posture and this accounted for his being attacked by 
ULIMO-J for ‘sabotaging all peace efforts.  Peace talks on the Liberian question 
have been held so far in five West African countries without any resolution simply 
because Taylor has vowed to rule by all means’33.  The political situation was 
almost compounded by an attempted coup by an AFL splinter which if not foiled, 
the mutineers would have installed one General Charles Julu as the Liberian Head 
of State34. 
 In October 1994, another peace talk was held in Accra, Ghana, under the 
chairmanship of President Jerry Rawlings.  The seven groups at the Accra Debate 
included the NPFL; General Hezekiah Bowen’s AFL; Lt-General  Alhaji 
Kromah’s ULIMO; the Lofa Defence Force (LDF) led by Mr. Francois Massaquoi 
and Dr. George Boley’s Liberia Peace Council (LPC).  Others were the mainly 
civilian Liberian National Conference (LNC) led by NPFL – Central 
Revolutionary Council (NPFL-CRC), a break-away faction of Taylor’s NPFL, led 
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by Tom Woewiyu and ULIMO-J of Major-General Roosevelt Johnson35.Foreign 
Ministers from Ghana, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Benin while Nigeria was 
represented by the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Anthony Ani while 
Togo, Mali, Gambia and Cote d’Ivoire sent representatives36. Prior to this, one was 
held in September 1994 in the same country ‘for the dissolution of the government 
jointly set up in March under a peace agreement and its replacement by a new 
State Council of five members’37. 
 Towards ensuring peace restoration in Liberia, the late Nigerian maximum 
ruler, General SaniAbacha, invited the factional leaders to the Aso Rock Villa, 
Abuja in 1995.  Here, an agreement emphasiswas placed on ceasefire and in 
September the council of state including leaders of the three major factions, was 
established, with Wilson Sankawulo, an ageing academic, as Chairman.  The 
Abuja Accord fixed elections for August 1996 and made provision for the 
comprehensive deployment of ECOMOG troops throughout Liberia to supervise a 
planned disarmament and reintegration process38.But heavy fighting which broke 
out between NPFL and ULIMO-J aborted the implementation of the Abuja Accord 
barely four months to the elections. 
 The final post-ECOMOG formation diplomatic move leading to complete 
ceasefire agreement took place on September 30, 1996 at Abuja, Nigeria under the 
Chairmanship of General Sani Abacha.  Present at the Peace Accord meeting were: 
Alhaji G.B. Khromah, Vice-Chairman of the Council of State of the Government 
of Liberia; Mr. Charles Taylor, Professor Wilson Sankawulo, Chairman; and Mr. 
Oscar Karyee-Quiah39. In the communiqué issued at the end, the Council urged 
reduction in the redeployment of ECOMOG troops to enhance the disarmament 
process and they agreed not to threaten their individual and collective security and 
to provide a conducive environment to ensure the security of lives and property.  
While reacting to the Abuja Peace Accord, the fire-eating rebel leader Charles 
Taylor, declared: ‘I am part of the collective decision that had been taken a few 
                                                 
35
 Daily Times, 12 October, 1994. 
36
 Ibidem. 
37
 Daily times, Friday, 16 September, 1994. 
38
 Lansana Gberie, op.cit., pp. 60-61. 
39
 The Punch, Thursday, 1 August, 1996. 
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months ago.  I do not know how many guns I have or how many soldiers I have’40.  
By then Yormie Johnson had fizzled out of the power contest. 
From the foregoing, it has been established how Nigeria demonstrated its 
leadership qualities in quelling the political uprisings in Liberia with its leadership 
qualities with the assistance of some other well meaning ECOWAS member states.  
She harnessed fully both military and diplomatic overtures, costing her officers and 
men as well as the hard-earned tax payers’ money. In spite of diplomatic 
bottlenecks capitalized upon by its antagonistic francophone neighbours it 
succeeded in taking the lead towards the formation of the ECOMOG Force when 
ECOWAS initial diplomatic peace initiatives failed.  She did not relent even when 
she was losing valuable resources in the war theatre to initiate the post-ECOMOG 
peace talks. 
   In the various peace talks, Nigeria always made itself available wherever 
such talks were held, even when not invited. It is interesting to note that it was only 
when Nigeria hosted the belligerents that the peace talks were adhered to.  That the 
late General SaniAbacha, the most draconian maximum ruler Nigeria has ever 
produced initiated the successful peace talks added to Nigeria’s catalogue of 
diplomatic laurels.  To have an eccentric and political hard nut like Charles 
Taylor41soft pedaling attested to the respect the nation has accorded itself in the 
comity of nations. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The paper examined the interface between Nigeria and the Francophone 
countries in their efforts to find lasting solution to the crisis that practically 
converted the entire West Africa into a war theatre. Although the former French 
territories, led by Cote d’Ivoire, had shown aversion towards Nigeria before and 
                                                 
40
 Ibidem. 
41
 Interview held with Professor Akinjide Osuntokun, age 65, at the Redeemer University, Redeem 
Camp, Lagos-Ibadan Express Road, on Tuesday 9th January, 2007.  The scholar was an Adviser to 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs during General I.B. Babangida’s regime (1988-1991) and 
Ambassador to Germany (1991-1995).  He was involved in most of the peace talks at the beginning 
of the war. He shared his experience with his M.A. students in the University of Ibadan in 2002 
among whom was the researcher.  The professor of History said Charles Taylor behaved in weird 
manners, shouting on top of his voice, and surrounded by trigger-happy ferociously looking girls of 
about 19.  The girls were his body guards who were ready to shoot on slightest provocations. 
 
RJHIS 2 (2) 2015 
 
 
215 
 
during the Liberian civil disorder, they worked with Nigeria and other Anglophone 
countries in marshalling diplomatic overtures towards restoring peace in the war-
torn country. The lesson to be drawn here is that nations should cooperate and 
work together in order to protect human lives and property as well as maintain 
international peace and security. Nigeria and the Francophone countries 
demonstrated a high level of maturity by swallowing their pride so as to save 
humanity from imminent annihilation and other countries should emulate their 
good example in their future dealings in world politics.     
It is therefore axiomatic to assert that in spite of unfavorable colonial legacy and 
indoctrination, socio-cultural and linguistic pluralism, the leaders of the West 
African States saw the sense and importance of cooperating and collaborating with 
one another in localizing in the first instance, and later putting an end to the 
mayhem that was taking place in Liberia. 
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